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ABSTRACT
Disabled Epistemologies: Failures of Knowledge
and Care in Shakespeare’s Merchant of Venice
and Othello
Amie Elisabeth Wambach
Department of English, BYU
Master of Arts
The presence of disabled characters like blind Gobbo in The Merchant of Venice and
epileptic Othello are handy physical metaphors for the failures of epistemology that occur in both
plays. Disability is often construed as a sort of saboteur of knowledge—disability of all kinds
inhibiting the ability to perceive the world as an abled person would. But disability also produces
a new, necessary sort of knowledge in order to survive and thrive in an unaccommodating world.
A disabled epistemology suggests that knowing is contingent on individual, specific experience
of the world. Tied to this issue of disabled epistemology is the issue of care—the field’s
emphasis on issues of relationality and reciprocity gels with disability’s concerns about
autonomy, self-determination, and accommodation. The ways in which care succeeds or fails
informs us of the ways that disability intersects with class, race, and embodied knowledge.
Gobbo is operating within a system that cares about him. Disabled beggars like Gobbo are
subject to suspicion but expected to receive charity, and the embodied knowledge required to
perform disability to an audience grants him access to that charity. On the other hand, because
epilepsy and Otherness are compounded in Othello’s society, to embrace embodied knowledge
of his epilepsy is to become too foreign. To openly acknowledge and work with his disability
would make him more socially vulnerable than he already is, but in ignoring it, Othello makes
himself physically vulnerable. The dominant ideology cannot allow Othello to understand
himself as disabled.
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Introduction
It is difficult to name a Shakespeare play in which no characters are impaired by
madness, blindness, missing or crippled limbs, or advanced age. This diverse use of disability
makes sense; disabled individuals are one of the few minority groups that is perhaps
overrepresented in fiction because of the narrative interest and symbolic power that disabled
bodies provide, and Shakespeare’s work is no different (Mitchell and Snyder 226). His disabled
characters often function as tangible representations of the themes of the play. Thus, blind Gobbo
in The Merchant of Venice is a comically literal example of one of three fathers in the play who
does not truly know his own child. 1 Similarly, Othello’s bout of epilepsy is physical example of
the way his intense but restrained passion overwhelms his sense (Schoenfeldt 799). But there is a
problem with reading these examples of disability as solely allegorical. First and foremost, to
read this way is to dismiss and suppress actual disabled experiences, to deny them complexity
and humanity. Knowing is frequently “disabled” in Shakespeare’s theater, and the presence of
disabled characters like blind Gobbo and epileptic Othello are handy physical metaphors for the
failures of epistemology that occur in both plays. But tying this disabled knowing to real disabled
characters invites further questions of disabled being, of the impact that stigma and impairment
have on both the perception and perceiving of disabled individuals. From the outside looking in,
disability is often construed as a sort of saboteur of knowledge—blindness, deafness, and
madness all inhibit one’s ability to truly perceive the world as an abled person would. But, at the
same time, disability also produces a new sort of knowledge, a necessary knowledge in order to
survive and thrive in an unaccommodating world.

All references to Merchant of Venice and Othello come from The Norton Shakespeare, 3E, unless otherwise
specified.
1
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Review of Literature
It is for this reason that disability studies in Shakespeare is a flourishing field, and this
paper would not be possible if not for the work David Wood, Alison Hobgood, Tobin Siebers,
Lindsey Row-Heyveld and others have done in exploring the ways in which disability as both a
metaphor and a lived experience overlap with questions of knowledge, care, and stigma. 2 The
field prioritizes readings based on historical context and the lived experiences of actual disabled
people living in the period. While fictional characters are obviously a reflection of the prejudices,
assumptions, and philosophical questions held by their creators and the period, disability
scholarship maintains that they can offer key insights into the lived experiences of actual
disabled people living in the period and even tell us more about contemporary disability. In both
method and material, this paper owes much to the work of these scholars, as well as the work of
earlier theorists like Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, David Mitchell and Sharon Snyder.
Care
The work these scholars have done on understanding disabled epistemologies is essential
to my project, but this paper builds off of that work to explore the ways that disabled
epistemology relates to issues of intersectionality and care. Care, as outlined by Virginia Held, is
an alternative or supplement to justice-based ethics in both public and private spheres. An ethics
of care acknowledges that no person is completely autonomous, independent, or rational.
Everyone needs care at some point, and the field’s emphasis on issues of relationality and
reciprocity gels with disability’s concerns about autonomy, self-determination, and
accommodation (Held 30). In his reading of Othello, Justin Shaw builds off of these issues of

The introduction to Hobgood and Wood’s Recovering Disability in Early Modern England in particular does an
excellent job collecting scholarship on disability not just as a strikingly material metaphor, but a reality.
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care, in particular Eva Kittay’s work on the networks of care—the social and political systems
that are, formally or informally, set up to help protect and accommodate people. 3 The ways in
which these care networks succeed or fail in Merchant and Othello inform us of the ways that
disability intersects with class and race in the world of the plays. Through Merchant’s Gobbo
and Othello’s titular hero, both plays function as a commentary on a disability rights discussion
that continues to be a pressing issue in contemporary disability ethics—who deserves care? Both
characters are privileged in some ways and marginalized in others, their ability to access care
hindered by classist suspicion and racist malice, respectively. On the one hand, Gobbo’s
blindness, in conjunction with his apparent poverty, subjects him to initial suspicion but eventual
assistance that reflects the early modern social system that Row-Heyveld has explored in several
articles. 4 On the other hand, as Shaw outlines in his essay on the topic, Othello’s race,
foreignness, and disability are overlapping categories of stigma that work to distance Othello
from the people and networks that should protect him, but instead exploit and surveil him (Shaw
173). Proving his disability makes Gobbo a member of what one might anachronistically call the
“deserving poor” and consequently grants him access to assistance. But Othello’s epilepsy makes
him more Black, more Other, and making that epilepsy visible only serves to further distance
him from the white world and from assistance.
Ultimately, the fallible, contradictory, and often prejudiced ableist world becomes the
arbiter of care. Given the fallibility of knowledge in both plays, care becomes an epistemological
issue. Beneath the question of who is deserving of care are questions of knowledge: How do we

See Held’s Ethics of Care for an overview of the field. See Shaw’s article "‘Rub Him About the Temples’: Othello,
Disability, and the Failures of Care" for his application of Kittay’s work to disability and race.
4
See Row-Heyveld’s Dissembling Disability in Early Modern English Drama and “The Lying’st Knave in
Christendom”: The Development of Disability in the False Miracle of St. Alban’s."
3
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know that someone is disabled or impaired? Who is capable of making that assessment? Can
disabled people understand a world that they cannot fully access? Are abled people capable of
understanding disabled people and making ethical decisions on their behalf?
Cultural model
The cultural model of disability prioritizes the complex relationship between being and
knowing, grounding disability in questions of epistemology and making it a useful tool for
understanding these issues of care (Hobgood and Woods). According to the cultural model,
disabled and abled people live in separate realities created by their divergent experiences with
understanding and perceiving. This separate reality of a disabled being in turn effects an abled
epistemology, exposing the fragility of both reality and ability. Perfect vision does not translate
to perfect understanding. If disability inhibits some means of obtaining knowledge and facilitates
other means (and if we understand that the same is true of ability), a picture of reality that fails to
acknowledge both epistemologies is incomplete. Furthermore, the nature of ability itself as a
fragile and unsustainable condition—even healthy, genetically normative individuals who never
experience a disabling illness or injury will eventually be disabled by age—necessitates an
eventual adaptation to new ways of knowing. A disabled epistemology, frequently referred to as
a ‘‘cripestimology’’ or as embodied knowledge, suggests that knowing is contingent on
experience of the world as it is rather than perception of the world as it seems to be, or as it
should be (Siebers 439). Embodied knowledge is the knowledge that is produced as a result of
being, of a body moving through the world. It is an epistemology that is dependent on individual
and specific rather than universal experiences and is practical, even occasionally cynical, in the
way it favors the material over the ideal. Characters like Richard III and Falstaff, for example,
use this disabled epistemology to navigate their world and manipulate characters by playing to or
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against stereotypes of disability (Siebers 440). Both Gobbo’s partial success and Othello’s failure
to thrive come about because they are disabled characters trying to operate with an abled
epistemology, rather than embracing a disabled epistemology. When we move beyond the scenes
in which their disability gets center stage, Othello’s and Gobbo’s failures and successes also
reveal the larger failures of knowledge and care that occur in the plays.
Mitchell and Snyder’s theory of narrative prosthesis articulates the recurring structure of
disability narrative. With its tendencies to permanently resolve or eliminate disability, the
narrative prosthetic structure overlooks the complications of care and embodied knowledge.
According to their theory, when a disabled character is introduced, that character creates a
problem for the narrative that must be resolved in some way. Essentially, disabled characters
exist in fiction because they are narratively interesting and useful for embodying the themes and
metaphors of the text, but their disabled existence cannot extend beyond the narrative—which is
why so many disabled characters end up dead or cured of their disability by the end of the
narrative (Mitchell and Snyder 227). In other words, narrative prosthesis is narrative resolution
as an alternative to care; the open-ended and ever-shifting nature of both care and knowledge are
antithetical to a tidy narrative resolution. Following the prosthetic narrative arcs of Gobbo and
Othello reveals that assistance, care, and embodied knowledge are intimately connected to and
dependent on each other. In both cases, disability provokes discomfort in those who witness it,
but in their attempts to cope with that discomfort and resolve the disability, how those witnesses
choose to deal with that discomfort changes how they treat Gobbo and Othello. The embodied
knowledge gained from Gobbo’s disability allow him to make himself more acceptable, more
comprehensible, but in Othello, the opposite is true. Gobbo is subject to mockery and
exploitation, but ultimately receives care, assistance, and charity. The responses to Othello’s
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epileptic fit, on the other hand, are exploitation (from Iago) and indifference (from Cassio). I
argue that this difference is a result of each character’s differing access to a disabled
epistemology. Gobbo is certainly vulnerable, both socially and physically, but he is also
operating within a system that cares about him. In his world, disabled beggars are subject to
suspicion, but expected to receive charity. The embodied knowledge required to perform
disability to an abled audience in the way that they expect allows him access to that charity.
Othello’s case, on the other hand, is inextricably tied up with his vulnerable social position as a
Black man and a foreigner. Where class has a more straightforward relationship with disability,
at least in the minds of the abled (Gobbo is blind, therefore he cannot work, therefore he is poor),
epilepsy in particular is inseparable from Othello’s blackness. Because epilepsy and blackness
are compounded in Othello’s society, to embrace embodied knowledge of his epilepsy is to
become less assimilated, too foreign for his society. Othello openly acknowledging and working
with his disability would make him more socially vulnerable than he already is, but in ignoring
it, Othello makes himself physically vulnerable to Iago’s more targeted venom. Othello is not
allowed to fully understand himself as disabled because the dominant ideology cannot allow him
to understand.
Methods
Disability Models
Before diving into my analysis of the two plays, a few key terms need to be defined.
Multiple theories of disability are in play when we read Shakespeare, and scholars disagree on
how to read an early modern text through a disability studies lens. Readings are contingent on
different models of disability—on whether the critic reads through a medical, social, or
cultural/material model. The medical model is focused mostly on individual impairment, and is

6

out of fashion in contemporary disability theory, but according to some critics is the closest to
how early modern individuals would have navigated disability—concerns about class status and
ability to work overriding issues of group identity and even of stigma (Hobgood and Woods 7).
We see this lack of concern with group identity in the two characters I tackle for this paper.
Neither character is lumped in with a group. Othello’s epilepsy is not a separate disability
category. Rather, his disability is treated by the text and characters as in keeping with his tragic
character and his outsider status. 5 Gobbo’s blindness, on the other hand, is mostly a source of
comedy; his characterization is restricted by both class and genre to little more than a figure for
mockery. This medical model also overlaps in interesting ways with the period’s humoral model,
in which disability is individual, but also much more universal. As it conceives of disability and
illness as deviation from an ideal rather than deviation from a norm, humoralism renders nearly
everyone disabled and everyone potentially disabled—an important distinction, given that
Othello’s identity and epilepsy is humoralized as well as racialized.
A social reading of disability, on the other hand, foregrounds issues of stigma and group
identity. Disability becomes difference, and impairment occurs only when a society neglects to
accommodate that difference. This social theory of disability is useful for grappling with issues
of stigma in Shakespeare’s work, but it does have its flaws, as Jeffrey R. Wilson points out,
because disability is often combined with other forms of stigma, and group identity does not
seem to be a concern for disabled people of the period (Wilson). Caliban for example, also
carries connotations of racial stigma alongside his monstrous body, and Richard III is full of

5

Hobgood, Row-Heyveld, and Schoenfeldt all build a case for this in their articles on Othello.
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queer and gender-boundary crossing subtext. 6 While it recovers disability from the medical
treatment of disability as universally bad, a social reading can fall into the trap of dismissing the
individuality of disabled characters, and ironically undersells the social isolation and oppression
to which stigmatized individuals are subject. And, for all that the social model celebrates
difference, it can fall into the trap of being overly affirmational, and denigrating the unique
experiences and complex strategies and compromises that individual disabled people need to
navigate the world—as both a physical reality and an ableist construct—which is where the
cultural model comes in.
The cultural model is synonymous with what Tobin Siebers calls a theory of complex
embodiment, and grapples with the way disabled people navigate the relationship between the
physical reality of their bodies in conjunction with the social structure (Siebers 454). According
to Hobgood and Wood, the cultural model “emphasizes the reciprocity between body and
culture, between lived corporeal difference and social perception of that lived difference. It
destigmatizes disability while still preserving individual, lived experience” (Hobgood 5).
Narrative Prosthesis
Mitchell and Snyder’s ideas on narrative prosthesis and the materiality of metaphor—the
concept that disabled individuals exist as an uncomfortably tangible reflection of a text’s themes
and tension—are useful for understanding both plays. As it often does, disability frequently takes
on a symbolic role as an externalization of the flaws of the hero (in a tragedy) or the society (in a
comedy). And while it is difficult to read Shakespeare’s treatment of disability through theories
of stigma, narrative prosthesis—the concept that disability exists in order to serve the narrative

For more on queering disability, see Robert McRuer’s Crip Theory, and his article on Richard III “Fuck the
Disabled.”
6
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and then be resolved or “cured” by that narrative—is prominent in plays like The Merchant of
Venice and Othello. If both plays are about, to varying degrees, the struggle to really know and
trust our loved ones, Shakespeare’s use of disability ties this emotional struggle with
epistemology back to a deeply physical reality that, like disability and the human body, is
simultaneously mutable and permanent.
Staring
Lancelet’s interaction with his blind father in Merchant Act 2.2 and Othello’s seizure in
front of Iago and Cassio in Act 4.1 are what Garland-Thomson refers to as staring encounters.
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These encounters are occasions for care that also initiate opportunities for testing and developing
embodied knowledge. The ease with which Lancelet and Iago twist these opportunities into
occasions for mischief and manipulation suggests that understanding when and how to access
care is essential to a disabled epistemology. Furthermore, these encounters suggest that these
disabled epistemologies cannot flourish without an extension of care. Thompson frames her
staring encounters as reciprocal exchanges. There is potential for learning and connection when
the starer is treated as more than an object of curiosity and instead becomes an active participant
in the encounter (Garland-Thomson 175). The two subjects of my analysis are both involved in
staring encounters; the success of these encounters varies in part because one (Gobbo) is active
and involved in the encounter while the other (Othello) is completely unaware of the staring
incident.
Additionally, Hobgood and Wood have proposed (also borrowing from GarlandThomson) that as scholars we participate in what they call “ethical staring” (Hobgood and Wood

Garland-Thomson’s work on staring articulates the complex dynamics of power and control that occur when
encountering the visibly disabled—dynamics that are at play in both Merchant and Othello. See Staring: How We
Look and “Ways of Staring.”
7
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1). Ethical staring demands that we critically engage with disabled characters in texts. It demands
that we engage in “a reciprocal interaction in which disability, disability histories, and disability
representations stare back” (Hobgood and Woods 2). My engagement with Othello and
Merchant of Venice is my attempt at ethical staring, at looking closely at what epilepsy and
blindness do for the text, but also what the text does with Othello and Gobbo beyond the
metaphorical level. The characters’ disabilities are material metaphors that reinforce the texts’
thematic failures of knowledge, but they are also evidence of a society that fails to truly know
and understand Othello and Gobbo.
Merchant of Venice
Merchant’s larger epistemological themes—including the distinction between sense and
knowledge—are embodied through the character of Old Gobbo. The clown Lancelet’s father,
Gobbo’s main function in the play is as a piece of comedy, someone for Lancelet to tease and toy
with. Lancelet’s mockery is based on Gobbo’s blindness and foolishness. But rather than just
being a vehicle for comedy and a material metaphor for the play’s broad themes, Gobbo (and his
staring encounters with Lancelet and Bassanio) is an illustration of the concerns that arise when
class and disability become overlapping categories. In his short time on stage, Gobbo’s disability
is introduced, his need is established as valid, that need is resolved through charity, and he is
dismissed from the narrative. 8 Gobbo is not cured or killed, but Bassanio’s decision to hire
Lancelet is construed as charity, a response to Gobbo’s approach and Bassanio’s query, “wouldst

Gobbo is an incomplete but rather neat example of narrative prosthesis as outlined by Mitchell and Snyder (1) “A
marked physical difference is introduced to the reader”--we learn that Gobbo is “gravel blind.” (2) “The narrative
accounts for the inclusion of this difference by recounting its origins”—subverted, when Lancelet tries “confusions”
instead of conclusions upon him. (3) “This marked difference is brought from the periphery of the narrative to the
central focus of its concerns”—this issue of seeing and knowing becomes a central concern of the narrative outside
of this comic interlude. (4) “There is an effort to rehabilitate or eliminate this difference, thus resolving the central
narrative conflict in a purgation of the social body or a redefinition of essential states of being.
8
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thou aught with me?” (Merchant 2.2.108). Gobbo’s prosthetic narrative also serves as a
prosthetic model for the other, less material disabilities that appear in the text, a way to make
material the issues many characters have with knowing their loved ones.
Gobbo’s blindness is an embodiment of some of the most unsavory early modern beliefs
about disability. The blind beggar figure is a stock character in early modern art and culture,
mocked or dismissed because he is powerless (Chess 1). And while he is certainly a subject
designed for mockery, his character has more dimension than would have been needed to simply
tell a joke, and his existence, if not he himself, is an invitation for a closer look at two
problems—how the poor and disabled are treated in this society and how Gobbo’s relationship
with knowledge is both dependent on, and reveals deeper flaws in that larger society’s
relationship with knowledge and care. This flawed but somewhat functional system of care is
accessible to Gobbo, but only upon the condition that he prove that he is actually impaired.
Blindness comes ready made with implications of poverty, impotency, and deception. As with
most disabilities, early modern people were anxious about whether or not blind people were
faking it, using their impairment as an excuse to beg, one of the only career options available for
blind individuals. Lindsey Row-Heyveld argues that the suspicion surrounding disabled beggars,
while present in pre-modern society, became more prevalent during the early modern period as
the transition from Catholicism to Protestantism dissolved the institutional religious protections
for the poor and disabled and diminished the ecclesiastical role of disabled beggars in society. In
the prior period, alms were exchanged for prayers from the disabled, a practice that—to a newly
Protestant nation—smacked too much of buying one’s way into heaven, and the practice of
almsgiving consequently became far more fraught. The religious injunction to care for the poor
and needy, then, demanded absolute proof from the poor that they were needy, and people like
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Gobbo would have been subject to emasculation, suspicion, abuse, and harassment from both
institutions and the general population (Row-Heyveld “The Lyingst Knave”).
But in spite of his role as a comic figure subject to suspicion, Gobbo’s lived experience
as a blind man also gets stage time here. He is not only a prop for humor or mockery. And he is
not just a reason to get Lancelet to state one of the major themes of the play either, that it “is a
wise father that knows his own child” (Merchant 2.2.68). Gobbo’s interaction with Lancelet is an
illustration of the suspicion and examination to which blind people in the period were subject.
While the character can’t tell us exactly what it is like to be a blind man in the period, his
relationship with his own disabled reality is clearly drawn and conflicting with Lancelet’s abled
understanding of Gobbo’s impairment, an inconsistency that makes it apparent there are two
realities at play. Gobbo interprets his blindness differently than Lancelet does, and even
mentions assistive devices, ironically calling Lancelet “the very staff of my / age, the very prop!”
which seems unlikely given Lancelet’s predilection for misleading his father (2.2.60). Gobbo
also links his own lack of sight explicitly with his own lack of knowledge. “I am sand-blind,” he
says to Lancelet, “I know you not” (2.2. 66). Seeing does represent a kind of knowledge for
Gobbo, but he also recognizes its fallibility in his case—Gobbo can see partially but
inaccurately—and is by the end is able to find other paths toward knowledge, even if his
continued inability to tell the difference between a beard and a head of hair suggests that his
application of this disabled epistemology is somewhat inconsistent.
In his role as an assistant who is ostensibly there to help but does much more to confuse
and further disable his father than he does to assist him, Lancelet uncovers the limits of abled
epistemologies and the practical and philosophical benefits of embodied knowledge. Gobbo
seeks assistance and is immediately misled because Lancelet’s original motivation is to mock,
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rather than assist. He exploits Gobbo in service of humor—an act which suggests that a blind
man is only as good as his prosthetic, “the staff of his old age,” and that assistance for the
disabled is dependent on the whim of the abled (2.2.60). Gobbo’s choice of the word staff to
describe his son explicitly positions him as a prosthetic caretaker, but Lancelet’s instincts to
mock and tease and the confusion that follows suggests that a staff with bad intentions may be
worse than no staff at all.
Additionally, Gobbo and Lancelet’s interaction has much in common with another scene
from Shakespeare—the false miracle at St. Alban’s that occurs in 2 Henry VI, in which a man
who claims he has been blind from birth recovers his sight. He is cross examined until he breaks
his charade and reveals that he was never blind. The interlude participates in a classic
philosophical tradition of questioning a hypothetical blind man who is both congenitally and
stone (completely) blind (Chess 107). In Chess’s analysis of the St. Alban’s scene, the cross
examination is not representative of simple paranoia and prejudice, but rather a way to break
“down some of the seemingly clear distinction between able and disabled bodies; though the
surface of the plot proves that Simpcox can see, and that his blindness was a false miracle, the
mechanism for revealing this fraud causes more doubt than clarity” (Chess 115). Essentially,
this interlude casts doubt on the strength of abled ability to perceive and understand truth. The
audience at St. Albans realize that in believing his story, they have behaved more blindly than
the masquerading blind man, and the value of sightedness as a way of ascertaining truth is
thrown into doubt.
Even though Lancelet knows his father is father is blind, his misdirections and jests come
across as an attempt to “test” Gobbo’s blindness in an exchange that simultaneously casts doubt
on Gobbo’s own reported abilities and on the efficacy of sight as a way to obtain knowledge. The
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only way to “prove” Gobbo’s blindness is to submit him to these tests. This approach to Gobbo’s
disability evokes Row-Heyveld’s work about the ableist anxiety surrounding masquerading
disability (3). When Gobbo appears, Lancelet first informs the audience of his blindness and the
degree of it. Gobbo is “more than sand blind—high gravel blind,” so somewhere in between
partly blind and completely stone blind, an external assessment that doesn’t quite gel with Old
Gobbo’s report of his own impairment (Merchant 2.2.31). This observation of degree is
interesting as a setup for Gobbo’s attempt to “try confusions on him,” a malapropism of “try
conclusions” (or to experiment). Lancelet’s “confusions” lampoon the medical and philosophical
cliché of “conclusions” that 2 Henry VI plays straight.
Ultimately, ignorant trust is the true source of epistemological failure in this scene, not
blindness. One of Lancelet’s confusions is to claim that Gobbo’s son (Lancelet himself) is dead.
Lancelet does not let Gobbo believe this long, attempting to guide him to the right conclusion by
asking repeatedly, “Do you know me, father?” (Merchant 2.2.65). Lancelet’s response to
Gobbo’s repeated inability to answer correctly is to plainly state the same conclusion that Chess
draws from 2 Henry VI. He tells him, “if you had your eyes you might fail / of the knowing me:
it is a wise father that knows his own son,” recognizing that knowledge does not necessarily
follow from seeing, and also that foolishness might be more disabling than blindness (2.2. 6768). While Merchant takes a comic angle, it ultimately accomplishes the same goal, inviting the
audience and other characters to reflect on their own relationship with knowledge—intimate
knowledge, in this case, rather than scientific. It also demonstrates the failure of embodied or
experiential knowledge while also doing the further narrative work of establishing the
authenticity of Gobbo’s need. Gobbo asks for Lancelet’s assistance instead of making his own
way, and as a consequence is further misled and emotionally exploited for the entertainment of
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his son and the audience. Gobbo is a fool as well as blind, and ultimately it is his foolishness, his
gullibility, that makes him easy to mock, not his blindness alone.
Furthermore, this exchange between father and son establishes Gobbo’s need for care;
Gobbo’s knowledge cannot, in this case, grow without Lancelet’s eventual extension of care.
Lancelet has established that his father is well and truly disabled, he needs any assistance that
would be offered to him and sets up a narrative expectation that that assistance will be granted.
Lancelet does apparently take pity on his father by asking, “do you not know me father?”
(Merchant 2.2.65). This decision to extend care instead of mockery opens the doors for Gobbo to
exercise his embodied knowledge instead of relying on the fallible knowledge of someone who
doesn’t always have his best interest in mind, initiating a more genuine reciprocal exchange.
Gobbo’s obtaining of knowledge does not necessarily follow from being told information, either.
It takes several more exchanges after the one quoted above before Gobbo finally accepts that
Lancelet is his son. This is played as foolishness, but Gobbo’s need for confirmation suggests
that he has learned a better way to get reliable information from Lancelet, not accepting the
relationship until Lancelet connects himself with a relationship that Gobbo is already certain
of—his wife Margery. This is something that a stranger, as Lancelet previously claimed to be,
would not know (2.2. 80-82). Gobbo fails to operate using a disabled epistemology earlier in the
exchange, believing instantly in Lancelet’s purported death with no confirmation, but by the end
of the exchange he has started believing in a reality that is based not on what he can see or is
told, but on what he can test against his lived experience. However, it is important to remember
that Gobbo could not access or develop this knowledge without an extension of care from
Lancelet. This extension of care levels the playing field for Gobbo and sets the stage for a more
reciprocal staring encounter with Bassanio.
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Ultimately the problem of Gobbo’s disability is resolved not through cure or death, but
through charity, echoing the play’s thematic concern with issues of money and charity. This
charity is an expectation that Lancelet and his father both seem to hold toward Bassanio. When
Bassanio enters the scene, both characters display this embodied knowledge by putting Old
Gobbo in his path first. “To him father,” Lancelet prompts, and Bassanio’s immediate response
to Gobbo’s “God bless your worship” is to ask “wouldst thou aught of me,” extending an offer
before assistance is asked for (Merchant 2.2. 106-108). This exchange, which gives Bassanio an
opportunity to display his kindness and charity, is apparently expected by all parties, a
surprisingly pre-Reformation social dynamic. According to Row-Heyveld, “disabled people
regularly engaged in a mutually beneficial exchange with the normative population. Able-bodied
Christians gave them alms (sometimes small, individual sums of money; sometimes shelter,
medical treatment, or large endowments continuing in annuity) and, in return, experienced an
encounter with the divine facilitated by the disabled person” (“The Lying’st Knave”). Rather
than relying on institutions to provide for Gobbo and Lancelet, which according to Row-Heyveld
would have been more expected by the early modern period, Bassanio provides for them himself.
The implications of this action suggest a different, less Protestant Christian culture in Venice or a
possible lampooning of the same (Gobbo’s foolishness makes it difficult to conceive of him as a
conduit for Christ). Regardless of any religious motivations behind the scene, it accomplishes the
same purposes of revealing character and resolving disability. Bassanio gets to be generous to
the point of prodigality and Gobbo disappears from the play.
As a blind man, Gobbo has very little in terms of social and physical power, but he’s not
hung up on it. He easily rolls with the constant adjustments to his sense of reality and turns his
disability to his advantage to help his son, making use of Bassanio’s offer of charity to secure
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Lancelet a job. Both of these qualities are hallmarks of Tobin Sieber’s theory of complex
embodiment, in which “disability presents as embodied knowledge involving a reciprocal
transformation between body and environment” and “disabled people may use to their own
advantage the misrepresentations of disability by which they are put at risk of violence and social
exclusion” (Siebers 453). We lack textual evidence that Gobbo hams up his performance of
blindness for Bassanio as he passes by (stage adaptations of Merchant might do so to great
effect) but his exchange with Lancelet does essentially this for the audience. Lancelet’s
“confusions” thoroughly establish the authenticity of his disability—and the extent of his need—
which in turn prompts a narrative expectation that said needs will be met. And Gobbo’s request
that Bassanio hire his son certainly plays on expectations of charity and compassion for the
genuinely disabled. He knows what to ask for and how, and Bassanio fills his role in the social
contract and gets an opportunity to display his Christian generosity to a member of the
“deserving poor.” Furthermore, the issue of Gobbo’s impairment is resolved. He may remain
disabled, but his one and only scene in the play ends with the audience and the characters assured
that he will be taken care of. The discomfort his blindness prompts is resolved, and he is returned
back to the margins, rendered essentially invisible.
I am not suggesting that we can fully read Gobbo as a nuanced or sympathetic portrayal
of the lived experience of blindness. There is certainly an ableist slant, his foolishness makes his
own claims of his relationship with his disability and with the world look more like comic
misinterpretations of reality, but he is also a better father than the other two fathers in the play,
who also fail to know their children. Without seeking to control him, Gobbo both listens to and
advocates for son, helping him get a new job with Bassanio, a master that Lancelet prefers to
Shylock. Complete knowledge might be outside of his grasp, but he is the only father in the play
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that seeks knowledge of his child instead of control, an important distinction. From an ableist
perspective, a disability often represents a devastating loss of control, but a more nuanced
approach to disability understands it as not necessarily an opportunity—but at the least an
occasion for new knowledge that returns some kind of agency to the disabled individual.
Additionally, as I will show below through my analysis of Othello, Gobbo’s encounters with
Lancelet and Bassanio demonstrate the ways in which care facilitates embodied knowledge when
disability intersects with class. As a comparison point, it reveals the ways those relationships
break down when it is race, and not class, that intersects with disability in Othello.
Othello
In Othello, the first thing we learn about the titular character is that he Black, and in the process
of rebelling against the social boundaries he is expected to stay well within. 9 His epilepsy is not
introduced until much later in the play in a scene that racializes his disability. Because epilepsy
is historically connected with both “greatness” and Blackness, it becomes an essential part of his
character and an illustration of the reasons for his downfall. At the beginning of the play, Othello
is a vulnerable man who has just made himself even more vulnerable by marrying Desdemona,
and his fit serves to compound that vulnerability. In fact, this vulnerability is the one thing
Gobbo’s encounter with his son and Othello’s encounter with Iago and Cassio have in common.
They are both vulnerable, and it is more than the nature of genre that one scene plays for laughs
and the other ratchets up the dramatic tension. Both are subject to exploitation based on their
physical and social limitations, but where Gobbo is eventually protected and allowed new
knowledge by the familial and social bonds designed to protect him, Othello’s multiple

I will refer to Othello as explicitly Black, rather than simply Other or foreign, in keeping with Ian Smith’s
arguments for engaging directly with Othello’s race in “We are Othello.”
9
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vulnerabilities leave him terribly exposed. Accepting a disabled epistemology is not possible for
Othello, because, in doing so, the racialized nature of epilepsy would make him more, not less
vulnerable.
While there is some critical debate about whether or not Othello’s trance can properly be
read as an epileptic seizure, several scholars have built a sturdy case backed up on historical
medicine and cultural context.10 By this point, medical understandings of epilepsy had also
emerged—including the Galenic understanding of epilepsy as a symptom of a melancholic
nature, and the geohumoral pathology argued by Paracelsus. According to Paracelsus, "‘the
pathology of epilepsy must not proceed from human physiology, but first the cosmic
phenomenon which corresponds to epilepsy has to be perceived and interpreted, and it will yield
an explanation of epilepsy in man’” (qtd. in Hobgood). Essentially, epilepsy is a response to
some outside stimulus yet to be identified—the weather, the cosmos, something in the air or the
food. Both of these definitions work well with what we see of Othello in the text; Hobgood and
Schoenfeldt both see evidence of a melancholic nature in Othello and both link epilepsy to that
nature (Schoenfeldt 796). But Othello does not show any evidence of this condition until
provoked by Iago, as an external trigger of sorts. He falls into a trance because of Iago’s
“medicine” (Othello 4.1.42).
Othello’s epileptic fit contains multiple meanings. It is evidence of his heroic nature—the
humoral price of genius. At the same time, the unreadable nature of epilepsy, as well as the way
it completely takes over the body, is evidence of and a metaphor for Othello’s lack of knowledge

For a breakdown of the debate on whether or not Othello should be read as epileptic (and strong defense for
reading him as such), see Cazan’s “What Shall We Hear of This,” especially pages 511-515.
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and his loss of control over Desdemona/himself. 11 Like Gobbo in Merchant of Venice, Othello’s
disability both limits and changes the way he engages with the world, but Othello’s heroic
disposition drastically changes the way his disability is represented in the text. In the period,
various understandings of epilepsy’s meaning and causes were at play. Supernatural and divine
associations carried over from the middle ages, and epilepsy was often paradoxically interpreted
as either punishment from or communication with God or something magical, associations with
the occult that fits with Othello’s characterization as a somewhat superstitious foreigner
(Hobgood). 12 His epileptic fit, in this case, is evidence of his incomplete assimilation into the
white Christian culture, a tangible reminder that he cannot completely suppress his Otherness.
What makes epilepsy so intriguing, on both a medical and metaphorical level, is how
easy it is to pass as able-bodied, except for when it isn’t. Like madness—another disability
regularly associated with a melancholic temperament and the tragic hero—epilepsy is an internal
disorder (Row-Heyveld 80). You cannot identify or confirm epilepsy in an individual the same
way you might identify blindness or a missing limb or a twisted spine, which means it is both
easier to fake and easier to miss. Barring further injury during a fit, it leaves no marks on the
body, but epileptic fits are strikingly material in a way that madness is not. According to
Hobgood, “Epilepsy's tangible signs — and, even more, the absence of them — might always be
misidentified or misread, resulting in an imprecise marking and ineffective disciplining of what
was considered to be threatening human variation” (Hobgood). Epilepsy, as something that
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For more on the connections between Othello, tragic heroism, and epilepsy, see See Row-Heyveld’s “Antic
Dispositions: Mental and Intellectual Disabilities in Early Modern Revenge Tragedy,” Hobgood’s “Caesar Hath the
Falling Sickness: The Legibility of Early Modern Disability in Shakespearean Drama,” and Schoenfeldt’s “Lessons
From the Body: Moralizing Disability.”
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Also see Cazan and Row-Heyveld.
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cannot be treated, cured or even reliably identified means it also cannot be controlled, a
connection that reinforces Othello’s passionate, superstitious characterization, and Iago’s
position as a skilled manipulator.
At the same time, epilepsy is a mark of Otherness that comes and goes, thematically
similar to Othello’s other forms of Otherness in that the degree to which he is Other is always up
for debate. How much does his assimilation to a white Christian society balance out his Black,
Islamic origins? And how much does his military and leadership prowess balance out the ways in
which he emasculates himself in his relationship with Desdemona? In fact, military service was
occasionally regarded as treatment for or appropriate avenue through which to channel epilepsy,
which suggests that Othello’s epilepsy and his deterioration after leaving a combat role are
connected (Cazan 508).
The partially invisible nature of epilepsy echoes these other conflicts, but also tips the
balance in favor of the Other. Epilepsy’s associations with mysticism and magic pull Othello
closer to his “savage” origins, and the consistently feminine coding of disabled bodies further
emasculates him (Hobgood). All push him further out of his society’s control, which, perhaps
paradoxically, makes him more vulnerable to Iago’s control.
I was initially reluctant to treat Othello’s race and his disability as related or the same,
because to not separate them is to risk erasure of unique facets of his identity. Treated separately,
it may be easier to understand the individual effects of race and disability on Othello. But this
attempt to treat these issues as separate proved impossible, because, as Jeffrey Wilson argues, the
stigmatized categories are so intertwined that to separate them renders them incomplete and
incomprehensible (Wilson). Intersectionality, on the other hand, allows for a treatment of
Othello’s race and his epilepsy—and the discrimination he is subject to as a result—as
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interlocking categories. Othello’s race depends on the early modern conception of epilepsy and
even more so, the early modern understanding of epilepsy is dependent on the early modern
understanding of race. To treat them as separate issues ignores the way they function in Othello’s
specific society. Humoral medical understandings link Othello’s ethnicity and his epilepsy with
melancholic temperament (Hobgood). Both are physical signifiers of Othello’s Otherness that
invite increased scrutiny—a scrutiny that, Akhimie argues, does the real “permanent damage to
reputations and to bodies” (Ahkimie 53). Furthermore, as Ian Smith argues, responsible
scholarship cannot ignore Othello’s race or the whiteness that surrounds him. To do so is to be
complicit in the marginalization and erasure of Black identity (Smith 121).
Othello’s disability and Iago’s orchestration of it are inseparable. He prompts the fit, and
takes credit for it, but also helps Othello through it, inserting himself into a prosthetic role before
Othello can even ask for it. Essentially, Iago makes himself a prosthetic assistant to Othello’s
disability. According to Nardizzi’s work on early modern prosthetic, Iago in this position
disables Othello further than he would be if he had never developed an overreliance on Iago’s
advice (Nardizzi 459). Iago, there to guide Othello through and out of the fit, parodies care by
referring to the diet of misinformation and manipulation that he has fed Othello and that prompts
Othello’s trance as “medicine” (Othello 4.1.41). When Othello comes out of the trance, Iago
asks further appears to extend care by asking “have you not hurt your head?” before directing the
conversation back to Cassio and his supposed betrayal (4.1.57). Iago’s false extension of care is
just one more way in which he manipulates Othello. Iago’s “care” restricts Othello’s access to
the truth while also solidifying Iago’s position as the only reliable source of friendship and
knowledge.
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While Othello experiences his trance, Iago further establishes himself as the only person
Othello can rely on, isolating him from any other avenues of care. Iago dismisses Cassio’s
attempt at care with his apparent expertise, claiming that the best course of action is to “forbear; /
The lethargy must have his quiet course: / If not, he foams at mouth and by and by /Breaks out to
savage madness” (Othello 4.1.50-53). He also uses the opportunity of Othello’s incapacity to set
up an incriminating exchange with Cassio. Like Lancelet with Gobbo, Iago exploits Othello
under the guise of care, and Othello’s reliance makes him more vulnerable, rather than shoring
up a weak spot in his abilities. As is consistent with an early modern understanding of prosthesis,
to seek prosthetic assistance is to render oneself not necessarily weak, but vulnerable, exposed
(Nardizzi 459). As evidenced by these two plays, this is especially true when this prosthetic
assistance comes in the form of another human—a human that is fallible at best and lying at
worst—instead of an object.
Iago’s claim to Cassio that this is Othello’s second epileptic fit, that he suffered another
one the day before, is meant to foreshadow Othello’s descent into madness and murder. Iago
here is continuing the work of discrediting Othello, playing on racist stereotypes (he specifically
describes Othello’s trances as a “savage madness”) as well as ableist ones to hint at Othello’s
instability. It also sets up Iago up as a sort of expert in Othello’s disability and makes Othello
reliant on Iago in the eyes of Cassio and Othello himself. In knowing about his epilepsy, Iago
ties himself even closer to Othello, because he knows something that might discredit Othello as a
leader, and he claims knowledge in how to treat that thing. It is just one more example of the
ways that Iago is able to control Othello as Othello loses the ability to control himself.
Essentially, Othello is no longer able to “pass” without Iago’s help, and passing is essential in
society in which his position of acceptance and authority is so fragile.
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In spite of the fact that he is abled and Othello is disabled, Iago is better able to operate
within a disabled epistemology—taking Machiavellian cynicism and the ability to use
stereotypes about disability and turning them against Othello. Othello in thinking things should
be as they seem, takes it all at face value. In his exchange with Cassio, Iago knows how to make
better use of Othello’s own disability than Othello himself does, playing on negative stereotypes
about disability to imply that Othello has become weak and unfit. Justin Shaw compares this
incident to anatomy theatre, with Iago as the surgeon, Cassio as the audience, and Othello as the
corpse. In pushing the responsibility for Othello’s care onto Iago, “the scene gives Cassio that
responsibility as he, discomforted by witnessing someone else’s pain, willfully relinquishes to
Iago what could otherwise have been an ethical relationship of care. Instead of embracing such
discomfort, he retreats and protects himself from both the sight of and proximity to the
experience of pain” (Shaw 177). Cassio’s discomfort or indifference then, is at least partially
responsible for Iago’s continued manipulation and exploitation of Othello, both falling into the
roles that Iago has arranged. Iago’s understanding of disabled epistemologies allows him to
exploit the abled lack of understanding or investments in Othello’s need for care. Cassio remains
too embedded in an abled epistemology to see Iago’s manipulation of the system.
Othello’s epileptic episode impedes his ability to understand the truth—making him
unaware of Iago’s open plotting or Cassio’s intrusion in the middle of the fit—but because
Othello doesn’t acknowledge that his understanding is compromised, he cannot find a new
avenue for obtaining knowledge. The exploitation of Iago and the indifference of Cassio and
everyone else leaves Othello to deal with his epilepsy on his own. Othello himself attempts to
diagnose a source for his fit. While he can still speak, he says that “Nature would not invest
herself in such shadowing passion without some instruction. It is not words that shakes me thus”
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(Othello 4.1.37-9). In trying to find an explanation for his own extreme physical reaction to his
jealousy, Othello blames not his own nature or condition, or Iago for putting the thought in his
mind, but Desdemona and Cassio. Essentially, Othello reads a metaphor onto his own body,
privileging symbolic meaning over the literal event. In his mind, this fit is evidence of the truth
of Iago’s actions. In other words, Othello believes his body is reacting this way in order to tell
him something important, which is, in a way, an example of complex embodiment. Othello’s
disabled body is attempting to tell him something. Othello uses this fit as an opportunity to adjust
his paradigm, to be informed by his body, but comes to the wrong conclusion about the cause of
his symptoms because he treats the fit as a prophetic sign to be interpreted rather than an obstacle
to knowledge to be accepted then dealt with.
Othello’s approach to his own disability is essentially an abled approach, reading his fit
for its symbolic possibilities before dealing with the practical effects of that condition on his
understanding of reality. His fit leaves him temporarily unaware of what us going on around him;
the bad intentions of his caretaker means the gaps in that knowledge will never be accurately
filled in. During his trance, Othello is apparently unaware of Iago speaking his schemes out loud
or Cassio’s appearance in the middle of the fit. Thus, Othello’s epileptic episode impedes his
ability to understand the truth, but because Othello doesn’t acknowledge that his understanding is
compromised, he cannot find a new avenue for obtaining knowledge. His overreliance on one
source of knowledge (Iago) limits his understanding with disastrous effects. Unlike Gobbo, he
remains misled because he fails to adjust to a disabled epistemology.
But even more than his own failure to interrogate Iago’s motives, Othello is failed by the
indifference of his society. Leaving aside the text suggesting that Iago’s resentment about
Othello is at least partially founded in race and that Othello’s anxiety and willingness to believe
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slander about Desdemona is founded on his internalized racism, society’s failures of care and
Othello’s own failure to work with embodied knowledge both stem from his society’s racial
stereotyping. 13 Othello has no agency in his staring encounter with Cassio. Cassio’s indifference
to Othello’s fit makes sense given the stereotypical associations of epilepsy with foreignness and
melancholy. Othello’s fit fits with what Cassio already knows about Othello. He is passionate
and “great of heart,” and Cassio seems disinclined to intervene when he witnesses Othello’s
seizure and when he suspects Othello is about to kill himself (5.2.455). In spite of an attempt to
intervene when he suggests that Iago “rub him about the temples,” stripped of his own authority,
Cassio joins Othello in granting more authority to Iago at Othello’s expense. As Shaw points out,
Cassio “invests more in maintaining socio-cultural hierarchies and proximity to Venetian
political power than in caring for Othello’s well-being” (175). Ultimately, when Othello breaks
down he is acting the way he has always been expected to act because he is foreign and Black,
and nobody cares or sees a point in intervening.
Furthermore, this failure of care is entangled with the concept of embodied knowledge.
Othello’s existence in a racist white society depends on a complex negotiation of when and how
he is allowed to display his Otherness, limiting his ability to navigate the world with a disabled
epistemology. He shrewdly uses this to his advantage in Act 1.3 when he defends himself from
Brabanzio’s charge of kidnapping Desdemona, but when epilepsy is added to the mix, Othello is
caught in a catch-22. Because they are so intertwined, to truly engage with his disability is to
engage more fully with his race, to lean harder into stereotypes that associate epilepsy with too
much passion and foreignness. To embrace his disability is to become too Black for his society.

In 3.3.227-74, for example, Iago suggests, and Othello agrees, that Desdemona’s attraction to suspicious because
of Othello’s race and difference from Desdemona.
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To play to stereotypes about incapacity like Gobbo does would undermine his authority and
exceptionalism, to acknowledge impairment and ask for assistance would only confirm racist and
xenophobic ideas about Blackness. Consequently, any knowledge that Othello could use to help
him work with his epilepsy is inaccessible to him. He is barred from both developing and making
use of a disabled epistemology.
Where Gobbo performing his disability makes him more acceptable and grants him
access to care, Othello doing the same makes him less acceptable, renders him less
comprehensible. But in ignoring that disability and relying on Iago’s knowledge instead of his
own, Othello opens himself up to exploitation and mistreatment. Othello makes the wrong
decision, but there was never really a right one. And while there is little textual evidence to
indicate Othello consciously makes this decision, the ties between Othello’s struggle to question
himself and internalized racism have been well noted in the work of Ian Smith, Janet Adelman,
and others. Smith notes that “Othello’s embarrassed confession of blackness as a stigmatized
identity coincides with Iago’s growing control over his black victim’s self-perception, thus
reinforcing the dynamic of power between white mastery and racialized blackness that degrades
black persons at every level of social interaction” (110). It’s a dynamic that plays out similarly to
the relationship between Iago, Othello, and epilepsy. Othello is not allowed to understand
himself because his world can neither understand him, nor allow him to understand himself. He
has little space to explore or create his own identity.
Conclusions
Unlike Gobbo, Othello’s disability must be resolved narratively with death because there
was never an appropriate place in society for him. Because Othello is able to work, he is not
eligible for charity, and given his more elevated economic status, wouldn’t find much use in it.
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Care, for him, can only be accessed more informally through his social bonds with his
comrades—a precarious situation, given that Iago is malicious and Cassio indifferent. Othello’s
disability functions as a social impairment in a social world in which he is already at a
disadvantage. The only options available for resolving his disability are a cure or death, and
nobody in his society is all that interested in attempting a cure.
The Merchant of Venice and Othello share a key theme that makes a reading of both of
them together useful. In Merchant, Shakespeare’s oft revisited exploration of knowledge creeps
in around the edges, especially when it comes to familial relationships. And knowledge takes
center stage in Othello, which explores the disastrous consequences of Othello’s failure to
interrogate where he gets his knowledge and how he responds to what he thinks he knows.
Disability, in both cases, plays a key role in the way Shakespeare writes about epistemology,
ultimately revealing that a disabled epistemology is often times more useful than an abled one,
regardless of whether or not the character making use of that epistemology is disabled. While
often played to add comedy or dramatic power to a scene, the presence of these characters also
suggest that Shakespeare was curious and thinking about the realities and intersections of a
disabled life.
When that disability also produces a class difference by limiting a person’s ability to
work, that discomfort can be worked through with formal charity. Financially cared for, Gobbo
can move out of abled sight and mind, no longer a concern. But there is no model for how to
extend care when the need exists on a social/racial plane rather than class. In Othello, epilepsy’s
ties to his race make him, in a sense, incurable. Racist assumptions about his disposition and
ambivalence about his position within his society make him an outsider, leaving him without
access to formal or informal care. Instead, he is subject to racist surveillance, indifference,
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aggression, and eventually death. To be disabled is to juggle both assimilation and performance,
a balancing act that becomes increasingly more complex when race and class intersect. Narrative
prosthesis may be a theoretical tool we use to understand disability narratives, but its ubiquity
suggests something about the reality of disability and the epistemological concerns of care. Real
care is open-ended, dependent on individual needs, personal relationships, and a high level of
awareness. As such, it is not the most satisfying resolution to the discomfort that disability
provokes in both narrative and real-world disability encounters, but it is necessary for ethical
engagement with disability. Care depends on attention and reciprocity, insists that disabled
individuals not be treated as passive objects when present and invisible when not.
Just as no two experiences with disability are alike, no two disabled epistemologies are
going to be the same, which is why my conclusions on this topic are by no means complete.
Questions of gender, sexuality and class in these plays interact with disability in fascinating
ways. They have a powerful impact on how these disabilities are perceived from the outside, and
how disabled epistemologies are constructed from the inside. Also complicating things are issues
of performance. How Othello and Gobbo are portrayed onstage can simplify or complicate the
presentation of disability in the text. Should Gobbo and Othell be portrayed by disabled actors?
How much does Gobbo “crip up” for Lancelet or Bassanio? How dramatic is Othello’s “trance”?
Does Cassio react with discomfort or compassion to Othello’s seizure? On a stage, these staring
encounters become more complex and more concrete and open up opportunities for real staring
encounters between actors and audience. Academic ethical staring at the text can open up the
possibilities not just for historical understanding of disability, but for thoughtful, relevant,
nuanced contemporary performances. By ethically engaging with disability in Shakespeare’s
work, we can further understand its intersectional nature, not only with other marginalized
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groups, but with issues of knowledge and social support that will never fully go away until we
embrace disabled epistemologies.
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